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 Differences in the evolution of income distribution in Poland and Russia in the post-
socialist era are striking: for example, in Poland, the gini coefficient on earnings went from 0.28 
to 0.33 between 1988 and 1998 while in Russia it went from 0.27 to 0.47 (UNICEF, 2001).  We 
argue that these differences can be accounted for, in part, by the different patterns of entry of de 
novo firms and of spin-offs from privatized state companies (for herein denoted small 
enterprises). We use regional differences in early privatization as instruments to estimate the 
effect of small enterprises on income distribution. Early privatization is a plausible source of 
variation in small enterprises because it can either foster or deter entry and development via its 
impact on the regulatory environment.  Using this identification strategy, we find, most notably, 
that a one standard deviation increase in the share of the workforce in small enterprises increases 
the share of income earned by the lowest 40-percent of the population by 1.4 percentage points in 
the Polish regions between 1993 and 1998 and by 1.25 percentage points in the Russian regions 
between 1995 and 2001. Our results suggest that early privatization in Poland was more 
successful in supporting an equitable income distribution via small enterprise development than 
in Russia.   
JEL Codes: D3, O87, P2 
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1. Entrepreneurship and the Evolution of Income Distributions in Poland and Russia 
The increased income inequality observed in the transitional economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is a topic of considerable concern and examination 
of its possible causes. (See UNICEF, 2001, and World Bank, 2000.)  The more successful 
transitional economies in Central and Eastern Europe experienced relatively modest increases in 
inequality, generally on the order of increases of 0.05 in the country’s gini index between 1987-
89 and 1997-99, and are still about or below the OECD average of 0.31.  In contrast, the CIS 
countries, which are generally seen as having less successful transitions, have average gini 
increases of  0.17 in that same period and all except Belarus have gini coefficients well above the 
OECD average.  (See UNICEF, 2001.)  These observations raise the intriguing question of 
whether the relatively rapid and successful creation of a capitalist market economy has salutary 
effects on income distribution.  This paper explores this question and contributes to the debate on 
why inequality has increased by examining the relationship between the rates of creation and 
growth of small private enterprises and changes in the income share of the bottom two quintiles 
within regions in Poland and Russia.   
The Russian and Poland illustrate two quite different transition experiences.  Poland’s real 
GDP increased every year beginning with the third year of the transition and exceeded its pre-
transition level by year six.  According to UNICEF data the gini coefficient measuring income 
inequality increased from 0.28 to 0.33 between 1987-89 and 1997-99.1   Russia, on the other 
hand, experienced a major contraction during 1991-98 and real GDP in 2003 is still below the 
pre-transition level, despite significant growth since 1998. Accompanying this income fall has 
been an enormous increase in inequality.  According to the UNICEF data the gini coefficient for 
income increased from 0.27 to 0.47 between 1987-89 and 1997-99.2  This paper takes these 
contrasting experiences as an opportunity to test propositions about how the entry and growth of 
new small firms is related to changes in the distribution of income.  If we find comparable 
relationships in these two vastly different economies it increases the credibility of our 
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proposition.  We then conclude the paper with some observations about why the Russian and 
Polish experiences and outcomes are so different.   
The next section presents arguments for why increased small enterprise growth is likely to 
flatten the income distribution and benefit those in the lower quintiles.  Section 3 describes the 
regional variations in income distributions and the size of the small enterprise sector in Poland 
while section 4 does the same for Russia.  The following two sections discuss the estimation 
methods, which recognize the endogeneity of new firm creation and growth, and the statistical 
results.  The final section presents some concluding thoughts comparing the Polish and Russian 
experiences and suggesting why Poland did not have the large increase in inequality seen in 
Russia.   
2.  New Firm Entry and Changes in Income Distribution 
Small enterprises entered as de novos, as spin-offs from state enterprises, or as the result 
of small scale privatization of state firms. In either case, there are several reasons to expect higher 
rates of small enterprise creation to promote a more equitable income distribution. First, these 
new small enterprises were virtually the sole source of job creation in the transitional economies, 
offsetting the layoffs produced by hard budget constraints, privatization and restructuring among 
the state and former state firms.  (See Bilsen and Konings, 1998, for evidence from Romania, 
Bulgaria and Hungary; Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2005 for evidence from Poland; and 
Jurajda and Terrell, 2001, for evidence from the Czech Republic and Estonia.)   The wages 
earned in these jobs will boost incomes at the lower end of the income distribution as they will be 
greater than any likely unemployment benefits.   
A second way that new small enterprises contribute to a higher and a more equitable 
income distribution is through their contribution to aggregate productivity.  There is empirical 
evidence that these new firms have higher productivity than the firms they are replacing, 
following the Schumpeterian idea of creative destruction. Using a detailed sample of 24 
countries, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004) document that in the post socialist 
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transition economies new firms are primarily small and the firms they are replacing are large state 
enterprises; they also show that productivity gains from entry and exit are most  pronounced in 
the transition economies (see also Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2004).  DeLoecker and Konings 
(2006) develop a comparison of new and old manufacturing firms in Slovenia based on estimates 
of total factor productivity.  One of their findings is that the net entry of de novo private firms is 
an important determinant of growth in total factor productivity.  Jackson, Klich and Poznańska 
(2005), using longitudinal data on cohorts of new and old enterprises, find several relationships 
that are consistent with the DeLoecker and Konings results.  They do not have measures of total 
factor productivity but examine sales per worker as a substitute.  They find that within cohorts of 
new firms both survival and growth are strongly related to average sales per worker, indicating 
that over time the most productive firms are employing a larger share of the workforce.  They 
also show that the wage growth among surviving firms in a cohort is strongly related to sales per 
worker and to the firms’ sales growth.  Lastly, their analysis indicates that wage growth is more 
closely tied to productivity growth in the surviving small enterprises than it is among the state and 
former state owned firms.  In the short-run it is impossible to say how this Darwinian process will 
affect regional incomes as that will be a function of the aggregate demand for and supply of labor, 
which will be related to more factors than just the number and growth of new firms, such as the 
unemployment rate.  (For discussions of how wages might relate to unemployment see Jackson, 
2003 and Tichit, 2006.)  In the longer run, however, with a competitive labor market the 
equilibrium wage will reflect this higher level of productivity among the surviving new firms.   
  Lastly, a high rate of entry and survival of new firms increases the competitiveness of 
product and labor markets, eventually eliminating the monopoly rents that accrue in concentrated 
markets (McMillan, 1995).  Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) argue that in the first years 
of transition small de novo and spin-off firms in Poland and Russia (and in many other post-
socialist economies) entered sectors, such as consumer goods, light manufacturing, trade and 
services that had been dominated by large state enterprises under socialism. The inefficiencies of 
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the state enterprises in these sectors created tremendous profit opportunities for initial entrants. 
Over time, the continued entry of these firms reduced these profits.  Johnson, et. al. (2002) show 
that in Poland by 1995 these rents fell as competition increased.   This was not so true in Russia, 
however, as the slow development of market supporting institutions and lower rates of firm entry 
led to the persistence of initially high profit rates (see McMillan and Woodruff, 2002).3 Also, 
Frye and Shleifer (1997) present evidence that in 1996 small firms in Warsaw were operating in a 
more competitive market than their counterparts in Moscow.   The small enterprise sector then 
provides employment through its job creation and also boosts productivity. If the entry of small 
enterprises is accompanied by the reduction of monopoly rents because of increased competition 
in a broad range of industries and if distortionary regulations are gradually removed, then in the 
long run we would expect that payments to labor would more accurately reflect the marginal 
productivity of labor and small enterprise entry is likely to produce higher wages. 
3.  Income Distribution and New Firm Creation in Poland 
Estimates of regional income distributions and of the size of the small enterprise sector in 
Poland come from specialized data collections.  The Polish Central Statistical Office does not 
disseminate publicly data on the regional distribution of income, necessitating a second best 
strategy. The Institute for Social Studies at the University of Warsaw has conducted the Polish 
General Polish Social Survey since 1992 (Cichomski and Morawski. 2002). This survey 
interviewed a nationally representative random sample of about 1600 households in 1992, 1993, 
1994 and of about 2300 households in 1997 and 1999.4 One of the questions asked for total 
monthly family income.  The 1992, 1993 and 1994 samples are pooled and family incomes in 
1993 and 1994 adjusted to 1992 price levels using the consumer price index. This set of 
respondents is referred to as the 1993 sample.  Similarly the 1997 and 1999 surveys are pooled 
and 1999 incomes adjusted to 1997 levels.  This sample is referred to as the 1998 sample.  Each is 
disaggregated by region (voivodship), of which there are forty-nine.   
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Measures of income distribution, or inequality, are computed for each region based on 
the respondents residing in that region.  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the means and 
ranges among voivodships.  (The Warsaw region is omitted from these statistics for reasons we 
discuss subsequently.)  The average income share of both the first and second quintile is 
essentially flat during the 1993 to 1998 period, being about twenty-two percent in both surveys.  
The average shares for the first quintile are also quite stable, at eight percent.  The standard 
deviation of regional shares of the first two quintiles increased between 1993 and 1998 while the 
range decreased, with the lowest regional share increasing by almost a percent and a half.  In the 
first quintile both the standard deviation and the range of income shares increased between 1993 
and 1998, with the maximum share increasing by over four percent.   The stability in mean 
income shares between 1993 and 1998 disguises substantial variation in the changes in shares.  
The correlations between 1993 and 1998 shares across the regions are 0.2 for the first quintile and 
-0.21 for the first and second quintile.  In terms of changes in shares, the mean changes are only 
0.1% and 0.2% for the first and second quintiles respectively, but there is a very large range, 
going from -9.8% to +12.2% for the first and second quintiles combined.  These statistics indicate 
considerable regional variations in the change in shares, and the question is whether these 
changes are related to the size and growth of the small enterprise sector.   
(Table 1 About Here.) 
The lower half of Table 1 shows the regional sample sizes on which these distributional 
statistics are calculated.  The median sample size is eighty one for the 1993 sample and 73.5 for 
the 1998 sample.  The smallest sample sizes are twenty-two and twenty-one respectively.  There 
are two important considerations in evaluating these statistics.  One, obviously, is the accuracy of 
the sampled distributional statistics relative to the population values in the regions, which is a 
function of sample size.  In our subsequent statistical analysis we weight by these sample sizes in 
order to adjust for these sampling errors.  Combining regions with smaller sample sizes presents 
two problems.  One is that it would reduce the degrees of freedom in our analysis relating 
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changes in regional income shares to the de novo sector.  A second is that the regions with small 
samples are not contiguous, making any aggregation very arbitrary.  For these reasons we think 
our strategy of keeping the regions intact and weighting by sample size is the best alternative. 
The source of error that is potentially more worrisome is that the PGSS study is a 
representative sample for the nation and for broad regions but not a representative sample of each 
voivodship. The potential problem created by this circumstance is that our income distribution 
measures for each region may only reflect the distribution among a non-representative subset of 
the population.  There is no way to address this problem with the current data, as these are the 
only data available for assessing income distributions on a regional level, so we proceed with 
them.  We can offer one assessment of the sample by comparing the sample sizes in each 
voivodship with its population.  The greater the proportional differences the less likely the 
voivodship is adequately represented in the PGSS sample. The simple correlation of the sample 
size and population variables is 0.93.  The ratio of the regional sample size to the voivodship 
population divided by ten is 1.19 with a standard deviation of 0.37 and the log of this ratio had a 
mean of 0.13 and a standard deviation of 0.32.  We correlated this ratio and its log with a series of 
variables describing each voivodship, such as its population, average salary, rate of de novo firm 
and job creation, etc.  None of the individual correlations was close to being statistically 
significant (the lowest p level is 0.25) and a multiple regression including all the variables had an 
adjusted r-squared of -0.13 and an F-statistic of 0.51 with eleven and thirty-six degrees of 
freedom, which implies a p level of 0.88.  Based on these comparisons we believe there is a high 
degree of correspondence between the regional sample sizes and populations and see no 
systematic variation in the deviations from this ratio.  Thus, with the corrections for sampling 
error we should get good estimates of the relationship between small enterprise creation and 
income inequality and have reliable estimates of their uncertainty.  
Measuring the size and growth of the small enterprise sector in transitional economies is 
a daunting task.  In Poland, however, we have access to a unique dataset developed by the 
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Economics and Statistics Research Office of the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) that 
enables us to focus on small de novos and spin-offs versus small privatized firms.  The GUS 
created longitudinal data tracking individual firms from annual reports filed by individual 
enterprises that measure the entry, survival and growth of new firms for the period 1990 through 
1997.  (See Jackson, Klich, and Poznańska, 1999 and 2005.)  The firms' filings are linked to 
follow the survival and employment growth of small firms that existed in 1990 and the entry, 
survival and growth of new firms that entered after 1990.  From these data we calculate the 
number of firms in each region in 1997 that were small in 1990 or had entered since then and 
their total employment.  These counts of employment and firms are denominated by the size of 
the workforce and by population, respectively. The density of these firms per capita and their 
employment share in 1997 and the change in their employment share from 1993 to 1997 are our 
measure of the size of the small enterprise sector in each region.  Table 2 shows the summary 
statistics for these variables.   
(Table 2 About Here.) 
One limitation of these data is that the GUS did not require reporting by firms with five 
or fewer employees.  Consequently these data omit information about the very smallest sector.  
Another agency collects data on firm registrations by region.  Their data for the firms with five or 
fewer employees grossly overstate the amount of de novo activity, for a number of reasons, so are 
not reliable and are not used in this study.5  Jackson and colleagues have done some statistical 
comparisons with the GUS and registry data for firms of all sizes (Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 
Appendix A, 2005).  They conclude there is no evidence of systematic regional differences or 
biases between the two data sources and that the GUS data are a more reliable estimate of local de 
novo and spin-off activity.   Thus, we feel comfortable using these data despite the omissions. 
The GUS data, despite the omission of very small firms, present several distinct 
advantages over the usual data that measure the size of the small and medium enterprise (SME) 
sector or that track the registration of new firms.  Most importantly, these data track both growth 
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and exit, producing a more reliable estimate of de novos and spin-offs.  We have already 
mentioned that the registry data do not measure exits, leading to an overstatement of the size of 
the small enterprise sector.  The conventional data on SME's present the opposite problem.  Over 
time the most successful new firms will no longer by classified as a small or medium sized 
enterprise and will be omitted from the SME data.  The more successful a region is in the entry 
and growth of a small enterprise sector the more likely the SME data will be to understate its size 
and importance.   
Thirdly, most data on the size of the private sector, whether limited to SME's or not, do not 
separate de novo and spin-off firms from small privatized firms.  The latter may function very 
differently than the former in terms of creating the amount of competition and growth needed for 
a healthy market economy.  In many cases limiting the measure to SME's overcomes the most 
serious aspects of this bias, but at the expense of missing the most successful new firms. On 
balance, we think the GUS data are the best available measures of the size and growth of the 
small de novo and spin-off firms in Poland.  We are confident these are new firms and that we 
have measured the number and employment of the most successful of these firms on a regional 
basis. 
4. Income Distribution and Small Enterprises in Russia 
 This section draws upon official Russian sources summarizing income distribution and 
small enterprise formation. We use published regional data supplied by the official Russian 
statistical agency (Goskomstat Rossii, 1996, 2001, 2002). These contain representative regional 
surveys of household income, regional registries of small enterprises, and data on the number of 
employees and sales in these new enterprises. Regional income distribution is reported in 1995, 
2000 and 2001 and the methodology does not change over time. Russia contains 89 regions; the 
1995 national survey covers 75 of the regions, and the 2001 survey covers 77. We match data 
from the national sample with our regional data set, which includes early privatization data and 
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other regional covariates, and obtain a sub-sample of 66 regions in 1995 and 2001 (Moscow and 
St. Petersburg are excluded for reasons we discuss in the next section).  
Table 3 reports the share of income held by the bottom 20-percent and bottom 40-percent of 
the regional income distribution in 1995 and 2001 and illustrates several patterns. First, between 
1995 and 2001 income distribution within Russian regions becomes slightly more inequitable: 
using either the national mean (based on the fully reported data set) or regional mean (based on 
the sub-sample).  Between 1995 and 2001 households in the bottom 40-percent of the income 
distribution on average lost 1-percentage point of their share of overall income; and, households 
in the bottom 20-percent lost roughly a half percentage point. Russian income distribution 
dynamics during 1995-2001 are very different than the relatively flat changes in income 
distribution in Poland during 1993-98. Second, in Russia, the more dynamic changes in mean 
income shares between 1995 and 2001 disguise less variation across regions. For example, the 
correlation between 1995 and 2001 income shares are 0.46 and 0.45 for the first quintile and first 
and second quintiles combined. And, while the changes in shares are also relatively larger (-0.5% 
and -1.0% for the first quintile and the first and second quintiles combined), the range across 
regions is relatively smaller (from -6.5% to 5.2% for the first and second quintiles combined). 
Nevertheless, there is more than enough variation across the regions over time for us to be able 
identify reasons for the change in distributions. Finally, it is also clear that income distribution is 
more inequitable in Russia: during 1993 and 1998, the bottom 40-percent (20-percent) in Poland 
receives roughly 21.65% (7.75%) of the income, while in Russia, during 1995 and 2001, this 
group receives 19.6% (7.35%). 
(Table 3 About Here.) 
We use small enterprise employment as a share of the regional workforce and the registry 
of small enterprises per 1000 population as measures of small enterprise development. These 
legally registered small enterprises include spin-offs from state enterprise and start-ups as well as 
privatized small former state enterprises. Thus, we are not able to separate small de novos and 
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spin-offs from the small privatized firms as we did in the Polish GUS data set. Before 1996, these 
small enterprises were defined by employment ceilings: over the course of a year on average a 
small enterprise could hire no more than 200 workers; and employment ceilings varied across 
branches, for example, the ceiling was 100 in scientific services and 15 in retail trade. However, 
as of 1996, small enterprises are defined by both ownership structure and employment. Regarding 
ownership, any enterprise, no matter how small, is not legally defined as small if it has an outside 
owner (a large company, a charitable organization, social organization or religious organization) 
that owns at least 25% of the initial enterprise capital. And, regarding employment ceilings, these 
have also changed and generally become smaller, for example, the highest ceiling is now 100 and 
applies to industry, construction and transport; and, the retail trade ceiling is elevated to 30 
employees on average per year. Because the definition of a Russian and Polish small enterprise is 
very different, our small enterprise data cannot be used to compare small enterprise levels in these 
two countries.   
Table 4 reports data on the evolution of small enterprises for pairs of years in which the 
definitions are comparable and for which data are available. Remarkably, the number of small 
enterprises per capita and the share of the labor force employed in small enterprises decreases 
over time. There is an increase in employment shares in only one region in our sub-sample 
(Nizhni Novgorod). Moscow and St. Petersburg appear to be outliers because the increase in 
labor force employed in small enterprises during 1995-2001 in these cities is roughly three and 
four standard deviations about the median region in our sub-sample, and roughly one and two 
standard deviations above Nizhny Novgorod. Thus, even though we are using somewhat different 
definitions of start-up and de novo activity, it is clear from the sub-sample reported in Tables 2 
and 4, or even if we include Moscow and St. Petersburg in the sample, that small enterprise 
development is much more dynamic over time in Poland than in Russia. 
(Table 4 About Here.) 
5. Estimations Relating New and Small Enterprises and Income Distribution 
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In this section we discuss estimation of the influence of small enterprise development on 
income distribution in Poland 1998 and Russia 2001, which begins with the following equation: 
,1 ttt DISTXSMENTDIST εδδβα ++++=Δ −                                          (1) 
where ΔDISTt,, DISTt-1, SMENT, and X denote the change in income distribution (measured as the 
share of income going to the bottom 40-percent of the distribution in a region) between period t 
and t-1, the income distribution in period t-1, small enterprise development and a vector of 
regional covariates.  In X we include log population to capture the extent of the market and 
education as both have been identified as important determinants of income distribution and small 
enterprise development.  The primary measure for small enterprise development, SMENT, is the 
employment share of this sector in 1997 in Poland and in 2001 in Russia.  SMENT is also 
measured by the number of de novo private firms denominated by population divided by one 
thousand and then by the change in de novo private employment share from 1993 to 1997 for 
Poland and for 1995 to 2001 for Russia. 
Estimation of eq. 1 is complicated by the possibility of reverse causality.  Gabszewicz 
and Thisse (1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) show through formal models that the entry of 
new firms in markets characterized by monopolistic competition is related to the distribution of 
income.  There is also a set of empirical studies arguing that more equitable income distributions 
are associated with higher rates of economic growth.  For a summary of this research see Aghion, 
Caroli and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999) and Forbes (2000) for a contrary view.  Keane and Prassad 
(2002) report a strong negative correlation between growth and inequality for fourteen transition 
countries over the first eight years of the transition.  If growth in these countries is strongly 
related to the growth of the de novo sector, as we believe it is, then our measures of small 
enterprise development will be endogenous in eq. 1.   
To overcome the estimation problems created by this endogeneity we develop a set of 
instruments for SMENT that should provide consistent estimates for the relationship between new 
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enterprise development and changes in income equality.  We use early privatization and initial 
conditions as our instruments.  Because of differences in data availability and in their approaches 
to reforms the precise variables differ in each country.  For Russia the two instruments are the 
large and small scale privatizations, defined as the number of privatized firms in each category 
per 1000 population (source: Goskomstat, 1994).6.  In Poland only data on large scale 
privatization, defined as the proportion of the 1993 workforce employed in firms privatized to 
that point, is available.  Additional relevant initial condition variables are the proportion of the 
1990 non-farm workforce employed in state-owned enterprises and the proportion of the 
workforce employed in private enterprises with fewer than one hundred employees.7   
The first requirement for our instruments is that they be directly related to the size of the de 
novo enterprise sector.  This assumption is inspired by McMillan (1995), who argues that early 
privatization affects the emergence of a regulatory environment that enhances the entry and 
development of small enterprises. It is expected that privatization, if done properly, weakens the 
political connections of the controllers of formerly state owned enterprises.  In this case 
governments, both national and local, would not have an incentive to use their tax and regulatory 
policy to protect state owned enterprises against entering small enterprises.  Further, governments 
can expand their tax base and enhance the standard of living by developing a pro-small business 
regulatory environment.  If privatization fails to eliminate these political connections then we 
have the same conditions that exist with a large concentration of state enterprises where 
governments will have an incentive to protect the large enterprises.  Berkowitz and Holland 
(2001) find strong positive relationships between new firm registrations and federal and regional 
privatization in Russia, but small negative relationships for local privatization.   
The greater the degree of capture of government agencies by the privatized firms and the 
smaller the separation of these firms from the government the weaker should be the relationship 
between privatization and new firm entry.  Poland and Russia have quite different privatization 
experiences.  Poland proceeded very slowly with large scale privatization while Russia privatized 
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very rapidly.  Several papers argue that early Russian privatization led to a corrupt regulatory 
environment that persisted through at least the mid 1990s while early Polish privatization had the 
opposite effect.  (See Alexeev, 1999; Berkowitz and Li, 2000; Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 
2000; Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Hellman, 1998; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1993.)  A number of 
estimates of corruption indicate far less corruption in Poland than in Russia (Johnson, et. al., 
2002; Hellman, Jones and Kaufman, 2000; Karatnycky, et. al., 2001; Transparency International, 
1996) and less governmental capture (Hellman, et. al., 2000).   These differences should produce 
stronger associations between large scale privatization and new firm growth in Poland than in 
Russia.   
Initial conditions are important factors in the development of the Polish de novo private 
sector.  Poland had a nascent small private sector and a varied mix of state-owned, collective and 
large domestic and foreign enterprises before the transition began.   The concentration of these 
enterprises varied substantially by region.  Given the importance of agglomeration, learning, and 
political effects the presence of a significant number of small private enterprises at the beginning 
of the transition gives a region a substantial advantage in expanding its de novo sector as the 
transition proceeds.   The presence of state-owned enterprises at the beginning of the transition is 
expected to depress the entrepreneurial process and therefore the growth and ultimately the size 
of the de novo sector.  These enterprises pay higher wages, thus raising the labor costs and 
reducing its supply for new enterprises, which will restrict their growth.  Even within the more 
benign Polish environment these firms are likely to be able to exert undue influence on a range of 
institutions from financial organizations to governments for preferential treatment and various 
subsidies, which again creates an unfavorable climate for enterprise creation.  Finally, there is 
empirical evidence from the U. S. and Poland that individuals residing in regions dominated by 
large organizations, which dominate the state-owned sector, independent of the size of their own 
employer, and employees in large organizations express less support for entrepreneurs and are 
less likely to say they would undertake entrepreneurial activity.  (Jackson and Rodkey, 1994 and 
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Jackson and Marcinkowski, 1999.)  All three factors lead us to expect a negative relationship 
between a region’s density of state-owned enterprises and the development of its de novo sector.  
These initial conditions will be relatively unimportant in explaining the development of the de 
novo sector in Russia as there was virtually no small private sector and all employment was in 
state firms at the beginning of the transition. 
A second assumption in our choice of instruments is that they are not systematically related to 
the change in the income share of the bottom two quintiles after we control for new firm entry, 
lagged income shares, education and population.  In other words, their effect on income shares is 
only through their relationship with new firm creation and growth.  In order to empirically 
validate this identifying assumption we take two steps.  First in the estimating equation we 
control for the influence of initial income distribution.  Initial conditions and early privatization 
are measured prior to our measure of initial income shares so that if these variables directly affect 
inequality their strongest effects should be on this variable and not on the subsequent change in 
income.   Second, we validate our exclusion restrictions by employing over-identification tests.  
(See Hansen, 1982, and Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003.)  These tests examine whether the 
identifying variables are individually or jointly correlated to the changes in income distribution 
conditional on firm entry and the other covariates in equation (1).  If we do not reject the null 
hypothesis of no correlation it provides some statistical confidence in our assumption.8
Based on these propositions the first stage regression used to identify the impact of 
SMENT on ΔDIST is 
          110311 XCONDPRIVSMENT εδββα ++++=                                           (2) 
where PRIV denotes the privatization during 1990-93 for Poland and small and large 
privatization in 1993 for Russa and COND0, which applies only for Poland, is the 1990 
employment in small private and in state-owned firms.9 We therefore use the variables in PRIV 
and in COND0 as over-identifying restrictions when we estimate (1) for either Poland or Russia.10   
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We make one adjustment to the data before estimating eqs. 1 and 2.  The Warsaw region is 
dropped from the Polish sample and the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions are dropped from the 
Russian sample because they are extreme outliers whose inclusion exerts undue influence on the 
results.  (The dfits statistics for Warsaw for each first stage estimation are about six times larger 
than both the next largest value and the conventional threshold for concluding the observation 
may be problematic.) Warsaw is the capital city with a very high proportion of government 
employees, whose wages are not determined by usual market forces but are more reflective of 
political interests.  Warsaw also had a large de novo private sector by 1997 and dominated the 
rest of the country in the amount of foreign investment, accounting for about half of all 
employment in new foreign owned firms.  Fig. 1 plots the proportion of the workforce in de novo 
private domestic and foreign firms for each region, ranked from highest to lowest.  Warsaw has 
the largest proportion of both, but as Table 2 indicates there is still substantial regional variation 
in the size of the de novo sector.   
(Figure 1 About Here.) 
Moscow and St. Petersburg are outliers from the standpoint of new firm creation: Moscow is 
4.6, 2.6, and 4.8 standard deviations above the mean and St. Petersburg is 4.5, 3.5, and 5.2 
standard deviations about the mean for the 2001 small enterprise employment share, the 1995 to 
2001 change in small enterprise employment share, and in 2001 enterprises per capita. (Standard 
regression diagnostics for the first stage regression equation confirm that these two cities have the 
ability to exert undue influence on our estimates.)   Also, the extent of foreign activity in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg sets these two regions apart from than the rest of Russia. In 2001, they 
attracted 48-percent of foreign investment. Figure 2 plots the share of the regional workforce 
employed in foreign joint enterprises that are also small enterprises, ranked from highest to 
lowest. Moscow and St. Petersburg have the highest and second highest proportions. While we 
exclude them from the Russian analysis because of their potential to exert undue influence, if we 
in fact include Moscow and St. Petersburg our results are robust when we use small enterprise 
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shares to measure new enterprises, while they are somewhat noisier when we use the small 
enterprises per capita or the change in employment shares.11
(Figure 2 About Here.) 
6.  Empirical Results 
 Tables 5 and 6 contain our empirical results for Poland and Russia, respectively. In panel 
A in both tables we report 2SLS estimates of equation (1); in panel B we report test statistics that 
check for the validity of our instruments; in panel C we report corresponding OLS estimates and 
panel D we report the first stage estimates of the influence of early privatization and initial 
conditions on small enterprises.  
(Tables 5 and 6 About Here.) 
Small enterprise development in 1997 in Poland, whether measured by employment 
share, enterprises per capita, or change in employment share has the expected positive impact on 
the change in income distribution between 1993 and 1998 and is always significant at the 5-
percent level. To gauge the quantitative significance (QS) of small enterprises, we compute the 
impact of a one standard deviation increase in small enterprise development on income 
distribution. Quantitative significance of small employment, the number of small enterprises, and 
the change in employment is 1.44, 1.58 and 1.72 percentage points, all of which are close to or 
above half a sample standard deviation of income going to the bottom 40-percent in 1998 (3.0 
percentage points).  
Panel B provides two sets of tests that check for the validity of excluding early 
privatization from the 2SLS estimates in (1). First we provide t-statistics and associated p-values 
to test the null that each instrument can separately be excluded from the second stage. For 
example, the t-statistic for employment in private firms in 1990 divided by the workforce 
reported in the first regression column tests the null that this variable’s coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero if only it is included in the second stage while using the 
identifying restriction that the other instruments are excluded. The remaining rows and columns 
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repeat this process for each instrument and each model.  Remarkably, in the nine cells for our 
three regression columns, the lowest p-value associated with these t-statistics is 0.45. Second, we 
report the J-statistic which tests the null hypothesis that the three privatization instruments are not 
jointly correlated with the error term in the second stage estimates (see Hansen, 1982, or Baum et 
al, 2003). All the p-values are above 0.4, so we again do not reject the null. Thus, the early 
privatization and initial condition variables appear to be valid instruments. 
Panel C reports OLS point estimates of the impact of small enterprises on income 
distribution. In all three cases the 2SLS points estimate are higher which suggests that the 2SLS 
has corrected for some of the simultaneity bias.  
Panel D reports the first stage OLS estimates of the impact of early privatization and 
employment in state enterprises on small enterprise development. The early privatizations, in 
each case, have strong positive and statistically significant coefficients and the concentration of 
state enterprises has a significant negative impact on subsequent small enterprise development. 
The F-statistic for excluded instruments tests the null that the early privatization measures and 
initial concentration of state enterprise can be jointly excluded from the first stage; and the partial 
R2 checks for the share of the variance explained by these instruments. Both statistics attest to the 
enormous strength of these instruments.  
Turning to the results for Russia, Table 6, panel A shows that all three small enterprise 
variables have a positive and statistically significant impact on income distribution in 2001. The 
quantitative significances are 0.98, 1.49 and 2.30 percentage points for the employment share, 
number of firms and change in employment shares respectively, which are all substantial 
compared to the 2.2 percent standard deviation in regional income distribution.  Again, as we saw 
in Poland, the entry of new firms and their employment is strongly and positively related to the 
increases in income share of the lower two quintiles.   
The t-test statistics and J-test statistics in panel B provide validation for using early large 
and small privatization as instruments for employment share and number of firms in 2001 and 
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change in employment share in the new small sector. The OLS estimates of the impact of these 
variables on income distribution in Panel C are positive and statistically significant and, as in the 
case of Poland, substantially lower than the corresponding 2SLS estimates. Panel D shows that in 
Russia, as in Poland, early privatization is always positively associated with subsequent small 
enterprise development. The early small privatization measures are statistically significant in all 3 
models and the large scale privatization variable is significant in one model. The F-test for 
excluded instruments and the partial R2  values show that these instruments are strongest in the 
equation for employment share in 2001 and weaker for the other two measures.  
In Table 7 we compute the indirect quantitative significance of early privatization on 
income distribution in the following two step fashion: first, we multiply a one-standard deviation 
change in one of the early privatization measures times its impact on small enterprise formation 
and obtain the quantitative significance of a particular form of early privatization on small 
enterprises; we then take this statistic and multiply it times that impact of small enterprises on 
subsequent income distribution. It is notable that regardless of whether we use employment, 
number of firms or change in employment as the measure of early small enterprise development 
in Poland, early privatization in 1990 is associated with a 0.6 to 0.7 percentage point increase 
while subsequent privatization during 1990-93 is associated with about a 0.3 to 0.5 percentage 
point increase in the income shares of the bottom 40-percent of the distribution. Comparable 
increases in the employment in state enterprises in 1990 are associated with a 0.4 to 0.7 
percentage point decrease in these income shares.  This suggests that early small privatization is 
relatively more important for income distribution. And, it is also appears that the impact of early 
privatization on income distribution is much stronger in Poland than in Russia:  the average 
impact of early privatization is 0.65 percentage points in Poland versus 0.22 percentage points in 
Russia This suggests that early privatization, via its impact on small enterprise development, has 
been a more powerful force for an equitable income distribution in Poland. 
(Table 7 About Here.) 
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7. Conclusions 
The empirical results show a strong positive relationship between the size and the growth of 
the de novo sector and the income share of the bottom two quintiles of the distribution.  In both  
Poland and Russia the average impact of a one standard deviation increase in any of our measures 
of new enterprise activity on the income share of this group is roughly 1.6%. This consistent 
evidence from these two different countries lends credibility to our proposition relating new firm 
creation to the income distribution, as we suggested in the introduction.  
These results take on added significance when considered alongside the Berkowitz and 
DeJong (2005) finding that a one standard deviation increase in the size of the small firm sector is 
associated with a one and a half percent increase in annual income growth during 1993-2000.  We 
did a similar analysis for Poland where log of mean income in 1998 and 1993 are substituted for 
the income distribution variables in the equations reported in Table 5.  Each measure of de novo 
firm activity is statistically significantly related to income growth with a one standard deviation 
increase associated with a one percent higher annual income growth rate.12  These results indicate 
that new firm creation is associated with a larger income pie and a larger slice of that pie for the 
lower quintiles, making the members of this group better off in both absolute and relative terms.  
These results also suggest that there is a positive association between per capita income and 
income distribution, and that small enterprises are an important reason for this association. 
Checking for the strength of this association is of interest since there is evidence that overall 
growth in Russia since 2001 has also been associated with some improvement in income 
distribution (see United Nations, table 15, 2005).  This issue, however, requires additional data 
and sophisticated systems tests and is an area of future research. 
The opening section notes the strikingly different changes in the Polish and Russian income 
distributions in the first decade of transition.  Our results along with the descriptive data for the 
two countries allow us to offer some thoughts about why these two different outcomes occurred.  
A critical aspect of the differences in the two transitions is the rate and character of new private 
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firm creation.  Kornai (2000), for example, recognizes Poland as a transitional economy built on a 
high level of organic de novo firm creation and of spin-offs from old state firms.  He contrasts 
this with Russia, among others, where the emphasis was on privatization, with much lower rates 
of firm creation.  Our Polish and Russian data are not comparable as the former measures new 
firm creation and growth while the latter measures the size of the small enterprise sector, though 
most of this activity is likely to be new firms.  What is evident in Table 2 is that the de novo 
sector in Poland by 1997 demonstrated robust growth.  Employment in these firms more than 
doubled between 1993 and 1997 and the most successful regions, even excluding Warsaw, 
demonstrated a very dynamic de novo sector.  Table 4 shows that in Russia, by contrast, the small 
enterprise sector actually decreased between 1995 and 2001.  Thus, even though we cannot 
compare their size, the data indicate that the small private enterprise sector is a much more 
dynamic part of the Polish economy than it is in Russia, as Kornai contends.   
The empirical evidence presented in Tables 5 and 6 and other authors’ analysis of the new 
firm sector shows that these new firms are also the key to growing the aggregate economy, to 
creating an economic middle class and to maintaining a relatively equitable income distribution.  
We also think this is an important part of the answer to the question of why the income 






























































Fig. 2: Distribution ofWorkforce in Small Foreign Enterprises in Russian Region, 2001
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Table 1: Descriptive Measures of Income Distributions and Survey Sample Sizes for Poland 
Variable 1993 1998 
1st Quintile Income Shares   
Regional Mean   7.94%   8.06% 
Regional Median   7.86%   7.80% 
Regional St. Deviation   1.08%   1.50% 
Regional Minimum   5.31%   5.85% 
Regional Maximum  10.38%  14.68% 
1st and 2nd Quintile Income Shares   
Regional Mean 21.68% 21.90% 
Regional Median 21.36% 21.82% 
Regional St. Deviation   2.55%   2.99% 
Regional Minimum 15.65% 17.11% 
Regional Maximum 28.80% 27.80% 
Sample Sizes   
National 4569 4151 
Regional Mean  95.2  86.5 
Regional Median    81  73.5 
Regional Minimum    22    21 
Regional Maximum   542   428 
 
Notes 
(i)  The Warsaw region is omitted from all statistics. 
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Table 2:  Description of Poland’s De Novo Economy 
Variable 1990a 1993 1997 
Firms/Thousand Population    
   Mean 0.32    1.92 
   Median 0.30    1.69 
   St. Deviation 0.13    0.79 
   Minimum 0.13    0.79 
   Maximum 0.73    4.42 
New Employment/Workforce    
   Mean 0.012 0.046 0.11 
   Median 0.011 0.041 0.097 
   St. Deviation 0.0062 0.020 0.047 
   Minimum 0.0036 0.016 0.036 
   Maximum 0.035 0.10 0.23 
ΔNew Employment/Workforce, 1993-97    
   Mean   0.067 
   Median   0.058 
   St. Deviation   0.030 
   Minimum   0.020 
   Maximum   0.154 
Warsaw Region Omitted 
 
Notes 
(i)  Entries for 1990 refer to firms with six to one hundred employees. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Measures of Income Distributions and Survey Sample Sizes for Russia 
Variable 1995 2001 
1st Quintile Income Shares   
National Mean (full sample) 7.61% 7.09% 
Regional Mean (analyzed sub-sample) 7.66% 7.15% 
Regional Median 8.00% 7.25% 
Regional St. Deviation 1.33% 0.85% 
Regional Minimum 4.70% 4.70% 
Regional Maximum 10.1% 8.5% 
1st and 2nd Quintile Income Shares   
National (full sample) 20.0% 19.0% 
Regional Mean (analyzed sub-sample) 20.1% 19.1% 
Regional Median 20.9% 19.4% 
Regional St. Deviation 2.68% 1.74% 
Regional Minimum 13.9% 13.9% 
Regional Maximum 24.8% 21.8% 
Sample Sizes (number of regions)   
National (full sample) 75 77 
Regional (analyzed sample) 66 66 
Actual number of regions 89 89 
 
Notes 
(i)  Moscow and St. Petersburg cities are omitted from all statistics. 
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Table 4:  Description of Russia’s Small Enterprises 
Variable 1996 2001 
Firms/Population (1000)   
   Mean 3.84 2.34 
   Median 3.76 2.18 
   St. Deviation 1.41 1.02 
   Minimum 1.71 1.09 
   Maximum 9.40 5.98 
Small Employment/Workforce 1995 2001 
   Mean 0.128 0.074 
   Median 0.125 0.071 
   St. Deviation 0.024 0.025 
   Minimum 0.078 0.024 
   Maximum 0.195 0.140 
Δ Employment share, 1995-2001   
Mean  -0.055 
Median  -0.055 
St. Deviation  0.030 
Minimum  -0.148 




Table 5 - Income Distribution and Small Enterprises in Poland  
Measure of small 





per capita, 1997 
Δ Employment 
share, 1993-97 
Panel A- Second Stage 2SLS Estimates Dependent Variable is Share of Income 



































Centered R2 0.64 0.64 0.63 
Panel B-Over-identification Tests For 2SLS Estimates: t-statistics 
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Table 5: Cont. 


































Centered R2 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Panel D- First Stage Reduced Form OLS Regression  
Dependent variables is small enterprise development, 2001 
Privatization variables 
(excluded instruments) 
Employment in private 
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F-statistic for excluded 
instruments 
14.7 10.5 7.25 
p-value of F-statistic 0.000 0.000  0.001 
Partial R2 of excluded 
instruments 
0.52 0.435 0.35 
 
Notes 
(i) Point estimates for regression coefficients and and standard errors (in parentheses) are 
reported. 
(ii) The symbols  * and **  denote significance at the 5-percent and 10-percent levels, 
respectively. 
(iii) Standard errors in the second stage have a small sample correction; first and second stage 
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
(iv) QS denotes quantitative significance, which is the impact of a one-standard deviation 
difference in small enterprise development (using the actual sample) on income 
distribution.  
(v) Small private firms in 1990 have fewer than 100 employees. 
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Table 6 - Income Distribution and Small Enterprises 
Russia Late Transition 















































Centered R2 0.69 0.44 0.16 
Panel B-Over-identification Tests for 2SLS Estimates: t-statistics 
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Table 6: Cont. 



































Centered R2 0.642 0.602 0.604 
Panel D- First Stage Reduced Form OLS Regression  




Large privatization, 1993 














Small privatization, 1993 
































F-statistic for excluded 
instruments 
28.8 4.86 3.11 
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p-value of F-statistic 0.000 0.011 0.052 
Partial R2 of excluded 
instruments  
0.40 0.22 0.087 
 
Notes  
(i) Point estimates for regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are 
reported. 
(ii) The symbols * and **  denote significance at the 5-percent and 10-percent levels, 
respectively. 
(iii) Standard errors in the second stage have a small sample correction; first and second 
stage standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
(iv) QS denotes quantitative significance, which is the impact of a one-standard deviation 




Table 7: Indirect Quantitative Significance of Early Privatization 
On Income Distribution 
Panel A-Poland 
Measure of small 










Early Privatization   
Employment in private 





Private firms in 1990   0.716  
Employment in firms  
privatized 1990-93  
0.339 0.467 0.472 
Panel B-Russia 




































(i) Indirect quantitative significance is computed as a one-standard deviation increase in 
the early privatization variable times the impact of that early privatization variable on 
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1 See Keane and Prassad (2002) for an overview of income distribution dynamics in Poland 
during the 1990s.   
2 See Luttmer (2002) for a comparison of income distribution in Poland and Russia.   
3 An additional explanation for the elimination of monopoly rents in Poland and their persistence 
in Russia is that Poland became more open to foreign trade. We calculate the share of trade in 
GDP during years seven through ten of reform (1996-99 in Poland and 1998-2001 in Russia). The 
share in Poland is 42.2%, which is less than the 54.0% share in Russia. Furthermore, the share of 
trade with non-transition countries in Poland is 35.2% , which is less than the 37.4% share in 
Russia (see EBRD, 2003, p. 178 and p.186).  
4 There is also a 1995 study that is not included in our analysis. 
5 Some registrations are solely for tax purposes and the agency responsible for these data do not 
record exits, both of which lead to overstatements of the size of this sector.  Including these data 
for firms with five or fewer employees with our data on those with over five employees would 
imply more job creation than job loss during the transition, which is inconsistent with the ten 
percent unemployment rate in 1997. 
6 The regional privatization combined voucher and cash privatization of large and medium sized 
companies. In an effort to avoid problems associated with over-identification, we do not include 
early regional privatization. 




8 As with all conventional statistical tests, not rejecting the null hypothesis does not mean we can 
accept it.  On the other hand, the higher the probability of getting our statistical results by chance 
under the null, the more likely the null is to be correct. 
9 The privatized employment in 1993 and the state-owned employment in 1990 are denominated 
by the non-farm workforce as we are using these variables to measure the concentration of 
industrial and commercial activity in these firms.  For the small private and de novo sector 
variables we are trying to assess the level of participation of the entire workforce in these 
enterprises.   
10 Hahn and Hausman (2002) and Chao and Swannson (2003) show that over-identification can 
create OLS bias when two stage least squares (2SLS) is used. Simulation results in Chao and 
Swannson (Table 2) show that one way to offset this bias is to use limited information maximum 
likelihood (LIML). Because the difference between our 2SLS and LIML estimates are negligible, 
we report only the 2SLS results (LIML results are available upon request). 
11 A table including Moscow and St. Petersburg similar to table 6 is available from the authors on 
request. 
12 A table of the statistical results is available from the authors on request.  
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